Abstract-In this paper, we deal with the problem of efficiently assessing the higher order vulnerability of a hardware cryptographic circuit. Our main concern is to provide methods that allow a circuit designer to detect early in the design cycle if the implementation of a Boolean-additive masking countermeasure does not hold up to the required protection order. To achieve this goal, we promote the search for vulnerabilities from a statistical problem to a purely symbolical one and then provide a method for reasoning about this new symbolical interpretation. Eventually we show, with a synthetic example, how the proposed conceptual tool can be used for exploring the vulnerability space of a cryptographic primitive.
INTRODUCTION
CRYPTOGRAPHY'S current research trends show that there is an increasing concern about identifying if a side-channel countermeasure is vulnerable to higher-order attacks. The problem is even more amplified as several previous countermeasures [1] , [2] , which were considered robust at the higher order, have turned out to be vulnerable [3] , [4] .
In this paper, we introduce a mathematical tool to assess the higher order vulnerability of a hardware cryptographic circuit. The method empowers the circuit designer to detect if the chosen countermeasure, where sensitive data are combined in a Boolean additive way with random masks (e.g., Boolean masking or a threshold implementation [5] ), is effective up to the desired order. Our overarching goal is to promote the implied statistical reasoning behind the countermeasure into a symbolical one, eventually extending ordinary computer aided design of integrated circuits.
Admittedly, this is neither the first nor the most general proposal addressing such an ambitious goal. A considerable number of recent works tackle the problem from the "information flow" point of view, by recasting it into either type checking or formal proof verification [6] , [7] , [8] . One peculiar characteristic of the most recent works is the introduction of probabilistic reasoning to produce formal proofs of cryptographic programs (e.g., EasyCrypt [9] ). While these techniques look promising, they require deep expertise in formal software verification and we believe that our approach provides a lightweight alternative that can be readily adopted by a much larger audience of hardware designers. On the other hand, the conventional, and more practical, approach to assessing the vulnerability of a circuit is simulation-based (see [10] for a comprehensive summary of state-of-the-art techniques). The limits of this approach, however, are twofold; first, the scalability is critically impacted by the simulation time. Second, the reliability of the outcome is very brittle, i.e., one can practically fail to generate the simulation scenario that produces a specific vulnerability. In contrast, our unique approach allows lifting the problem into a symbolic setting, allowing deterministic reasoning and avoiding simulations.
First of all, in Section 2 we introduce precise definitions of nth order and uni/multivariate vulnerability and shed some new light on the connection between combining functions and vulnerability itself. In Section 3, under some stricter hypotheses, we promote the search for vulnerabilities from a statistical problem to a purely symbolical one. We then provide a method for reasoning about this new symbolical interpretation, by introducing new conditions for vulnerability (i.e., the xor-condition) and by exploiting a few classical results of linear algebra in the binary field F 2 . Eventually, in Section 4 we apply our method to analyze a realistic higher order countermeasure.
NOTATION AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
To define the notation used throughout this paper, we follow some common standards [11] . We use calligraphic letters for sets, e.g., X , and capital letters, e.g., X, for random variables. A generic but deterministic value in X is denoted by lowercase
, where x i 2 X for all i ¼ 1; . . . ; m. We will denote by Hðx xÞ the Hamming weight of a binary string x x.
If A and B are events, the notations PðAÞ and PðA j BÞ refer to the probability of A and to the conditional probability of A given B. Similarly, if X and Y are random variables, E½X and E½X j Y refer to the expectation of X and to the conditional expectation of X given Y respectively. Finally, the expectation of X given the event that Y takes the deterministic value y is denoted by E½X j Y ¼ y.
Univariate Vulnerability
In our work, we define as side-channel any physically observable outlet that unintentionally leaks some information from a hardware cryptographic primitive. A side-channel attack corresponds to a set of queries to a physical observable whose aim is to identify the value of a master key/sub-key K of the primitive [12] .
Cryptographic primitives may expose, through a side-channel, one or many intermediate Boolean values, which we call visible variables and denote by the letter V because they are effectively processed by the hardware. On the other hand, we call sensitive variables the values that are deterministic functions of both the master key K and the public input P ; we denote them by S ¼ SðK; P Þ [13] , [14] . For the moment, we note that visible variables are not always sensitive themselves.
Information about a visible value V , hence possibly about some sensitive values, can be derived from observations of a (data dependent) leakage [11] 
Here, c is a pseudo-Boolean function, 1 while N is a Gaussian random variable which is commonly used to account for measurement noise.
Under the assumption that V is actually a sensitive value S, one might consider a prediction functionL Lðk; P Þ ¼ĉðSðk; P ÞÞ; where k is any possible value of the key and P is a random plain text. A side-channel attack can thus be mounted by using a distinguisher function DðLðK; ÁÞ;Lðk; ÁÞÞ; monotonically related to the statistical dependency between the actual leakage LðK; P Þ measured with several random plain texts P , and the leakage model valueLðk; P Þ computed using the same plain texts [11] . The attack consists in the optimization problem that aims to find the key guess k g maximizing the distinguisher k g ¼ argmax k DðLðK; ÁÞ;Lðk; ÁÞÞ:
It is thus natural to make the following definition of vulnerability to side-channel attacks.
Definition 1 (Vulnerability). We say that a leakage L is vulnerable (to a side-channel attack) if it is statistically dependent on a sensitive value, i.e.,
for some s 1 ; s 2 2 S and l 2 L.
If such a vulnerability exists, then a distinguisher D may be used to mount an attack.
Example 1 (Correlation Power Analysis Attack of AES). In this type of attack [14] , [15] , the side-channel considered is the power consumption of the device. The assumption is that a visible value V is actually sensitive, for example it corresponds to the output of the AES SBOX in the first round
Assuming that the leakage is dependent on the Hamming weight of V , the attacker can use the prediction function Lðk; P Þ ¼ HðSðk; P ÞÞ ; and the Pearson's correlation coefficient as a distinguisher to detect the linear statistical dependence betweenL and L and thus derive the best guess for k.
Masking and Higher Order Attacks
To safeguard against the vulnerability expressed in eq. (3), a customary solution is to prevent a sensitive value S to become visible, by splitting S into d shares V 1 ; . . . ; V d , which are actually processed instead. This means that
where $ is a group operation (usually the bitwise XOR), V 2 ; . . . ; V d are random uniformly distributed values called masks, and V 1 is the masked variable defined in such a way that eq. (4) holds. Thus, each of the shares turns out to be statistically independent of S and cannot be used alone to mount an attack. However, this procedure does not remove any possible vulnerability: if the leakage L involves more than one share, it might still depend on S. This dependence is often revealed by a combining function CðLÞ of the leakage: if the expected value of CðLÞ given S is not constant, then an attack can still be mounted. See [16] for an in-depth analysis of available combining functions. In most cases, C is a polynomial of order greater than one, so that the term higher order attack is commonly adopted: Definition 2 (Vulnerability to an nth order attack). We say that L is vulnerable to an nth order attack if one of its nth conditional moments given S is not constant, i.e., there exists an nth degree polynomial CðLÞ such that
for some s 1 ; s 2 2 S.
Example 2 (Second-order univariate CPA). Let us consider the same scenario of Example 1, assuming now that the device uses a first-order countermeasure. The value S ¼ Sðk; P Þ is thus never explicitly processed, but it is replaced by V 1 ¼ S È M and V 2 ¼ M, where M is a mask. Suppose that it is possible to observe a leakage that depends on both shares 2 :
The expectation E½L j S does not depend on S, showing that a first order attack fails. However, setting
the second central moment E½CðLÞ j S does depend on S. As shown in [16] , this combining function can be used, together with the correlation distinguisher, to derive an optimal key guess.
Multivariate Vulnerability
The concept of vulnerability stated in Definition 1 can be directly extended to the case where the visible variables are spread over several leakages
. If an attack exploits the information given by a vector of l leakages, we say that such an attack is l-variate. Definition 2 can be generalized to the case of multivariate leakages, by considering an nth degree polynomial CðLÞ : R l ! R in l variables as a combining function, so that the two sides of inequality (5) are mixed conditional moments.
Example 3 (Second-order bi-variate CPA). Let us go back to Example 2, assuming now that the implementation processes only one single share at a time instead of both at the same time. We then have two leakages related to the same sensitive variable S
where
The second central mixed moment E½CðLÞ j S corresponding to the combining function
depends on S and can be used to mount a second order bivariate attack, as shown in [16] .
Remarks on Moment-Based Attacks
Formulas (6) and (7) suggest that statistical moments play an important role in pointing out the vulnerability of a circuit. In fact, some scholars have already noticed that vulnerability arises when a difference in conditional distributions can be detected by looking at the statistical moments through suitable polynomial combining functions. Actually, as demonstrated in [16] , there exist some nonpolynomial functions that work as well, although not as efficiently. Nevertheless, we can ask ourselves the following question: if no nth order attack can be mounted for any n, might the leakage be still vulnerable? The answer is fortunately negative, as we shall see. Let us first clearly state our leakage model:
where c 1 ; . . . ; c l are pseudo-Boolean functions and N 1 ; . . . ; N l are Gaussian random variables independent of each other and independent of any other variable.
Under this assumption, it is possible to prove the following theorem, which answers our question:
Proof. See Appendix.
t u
It is worth noting that some different attack approach that is more general (such as MIA [14] ), or more efficient, in practical scenarios may exist. Yet, Theorem 1 ensures that if a vulnerability is present, there must exist a corresponding polynomial combining function. Accordingly, the analysis performed on such polynomial combining functions is sufficient to assess the presence or lack of any vulnerability.
A METHOD FOR DETECTING HIGHER ORDER VULNERABILITY
In this section, we introduce a method to detect higher-order leakage vulnerability by directly analyzing the relationship between visible variables and sensitive ones. This could be extremely useful when the designer of a (hardware) countermeasure wants to make sure that the device does not leak any information up to a certain attack order without performing a full-blown statistical analysis at design time. Throughout this section, for convenience, we consider all the sensitive, mask and visible bits in column vectors
We now restrict the leakage model described in Assumption 1, by making the following assumption:
where c i;j 's are real coefficients, and N 1 ; . . . ; N l are Gaussian noises independent of each other and of any other variable.
Given that c i;j can assume arbitrary values for each bit, Assumption 2 is extremely general. For example, it covers i) a one to one mapping between each value of the visible variables and each value of the leakages (e.g., the identity function)-this is the most desirable case for an attacker-and ii) the Hamming weight of some binary string when c i;j is 1 iff the jth visible bit leaks through the ith leakage (and 0 otherwise).
As we will see in Theorem 2, the assumption above allows connecting the nth order leakage vulnerability to the n-vulnerability of the visible vector, in the sense specified by the following definition: Definition 3. We say that V V is vulnerable if it is not independent of S S and n-vulnerable if the minimal vulnerable subset of visible bits in V V is of size n.
We point out that the property of n-vulnerability for a visible vector can be checked, as we will see later on, without resorting to statistical experiments. Remark 1. We are considering V V and S S as composed of v and s variables of 1 bit respectively. In our practical application (see Section 4), however, we deal with variables which can be b bits wide (e.g., 8 bits in the AES SBOX). It is straightforward to extend the above definition of n-vulnerability accordingly.
Remark 2. The n-vulnerability indicates the order of the corresponding attack only. Once an n-vulnerability has been detected, it is possible to derive the leakages involved by inspecting c i;j 's. As we will see in Section 3.2, this allows building the combining function; in particular, the attack will be either univariate or multivariate according to the number of leakages involved.
The following theorem explains how n-vulnerability is connected with our overarching goal of detecting leakage vulnerability. Theorem 2. If the vector of visible variables is n-vulnerable, then any leakage of type (8) (see Assumption 2) is secure against attacks of order lower than n.
l be the vector of sensitive variables, an n-vulnerable visible vector and a leakage of type (8) respectively. We need to prove that E½CðL LÞ j S S is constant for any polynomial CðL LÞ of degree d < n in the variables L i 's. By (8) , each L i can be considered as a real polynomial of degree 1 in the variables V j 's (j ¼ 1; . . . ; v) and N i . Therefore, CðL LÞ can be considered as a polynomial of degree d in the set of variables
i.e., as a sum of a certain number r of monomials C 1 ðVÞ; . .
Each C i ðVÞ is of degree < n, hence it depends on less than n visible bits V j 's. Since V V is n-vulnerable by hypothesis, C i ðVÞ is independent of S S, hence all the conditional expectations in the sum above are constant. This proves that E½CðL LÞ j S S is constant, as required. t u
On the grounds of Theorem 2, it is thus possible to cast the problem of detecting an nth order leakage vulnerability to the n-vulnerability of the corresponding visible variables.
Detecting n-Vulnerability
It is now natural to ask ourselves if it is possible to easily detect n-vulnerability. It turns out that, if we restrict ourselves to the case of Boolean-additive masking where visible variables are F 2 -sums of sensitive variables and masks, it is possible to devise a symbolic method to detect such a vulnerability. More formally, we assume that visible variables are related to masks and sensitive variables by the following matrix expression in F 2 :
where A ¼ ða i;j Þ and B ¼ ðb i;j Þ are matrices with entries in F 2 , of size v Â s and v Â m respectively. We will call C ¼ B A ½ the visible variables' matrix. Thus, V i turns out to be the F 2 -sum of all M h 's such that b i;h ¼ 1 and all S j 's such that a i;j ¼ 1
In this setting, we define the following condition associated with the matrix structure of C:
Definition 4 (xor-condition). We say that a visible vector V V 2 F v 2 satisfies the xor-condition if there exists a constant row vector
cancels out any mask contribution (i.e., B ¼ 0 0) and is a non-constant random variable.
Roughly speaking, the xor-condition holds when there is a combination of visible bits that: i) does not depend on masks and ii) does depend on some sensitive value. Its importance is highlighted by the following theorem, which permits establishing if V V is vulnerable:
be the sensitive, mask and visible vectors respectively, being A and B deterministic F 2 -matrices.
1 and ii) mask bits undergo only F 2 -linear transformations. While these might seem tight restrictions, we recall that they hold for notable classes of implementations [1] , [17] , as well as those parts of threshold-based implementations where masks are transformed linearly [5] , [18] .
We now deduce a straightforward consequence of Theorem 3, and combine it with what we know from Theorem 2: Corollary 1. Assume that S S and M M are independent and M M is uniformly distributed in F m 2 . Then, a visible vector V V is n-vulnerable if and only if n is the minimum integer such that the xor-condition holds w.r.t. a vector with Hamming weight Hð Þ ¼ n. In this case, any leakage of type (8) is secure against attacks of order lower than n.
The Hamming weight of corresponds here to the number of visible variables that actually combines.
Example 4. Consider the following visible variables:
In this case, we have only three values of 2 F 
For any other , we have that V V does show mask contributions. Notice however that the xor-condition does not hold for ¼ ð1; 1; 1; 0Þ, because ð1; 1; 1; 0Þ Á V V is constant. Looking at the other two combinations, we see that the xor-condition holds for ð0; 0; 1; 1Þ and ð1; 1; 0; 1Þ iff S 1 È S 2 is non-constant (this is true, for example, when S 1 and S 2 are independent). In this case, we deduce from Theorem 3 that V V is vulnerable. More specifically, by Corollary 1, V V is two-vulnerable. A circuit with leakages of type (8) involving these visible variables might then be vulnerable to 2nd order attacks.
Assuming now that all sensitive bits are independent, any F 2 -sum of them is non-constant, unless some of them cancel out. In such a case, we can restate Corollary 1 as an easy-to-verify property of the visible variables' matrix: 
In other words, one needs to find the row vectors that satisfy the (typically under-determined) F 2 -linear system B ¼ 0 0 but do not satisfy A ¼ 0 0: these correspond to all and only the vulnerable combinations.
The formalization expressed in (10) is compliant with the problem space of a Satisfiability Modulo Theory solver [19] . In practice, even though this is an exponentially complex problem, we have found that it is even tractable by brute force.
Finding a Combination Function to Exploit the Vulnerability
Once an n-vulnerable combination has been found, by looking at the coefficients c i;j 's (see Assumption 2) we can build a combining function in the following way:
Note that, for each visible variable V j in the vulnerable combination, there might be more than one i such that c i;j ¼ 1, hence the combining function may not be unique.
Determining Whether the xor-Condition Holds
Under the same hypotheses of Corollary 2, which we will always assume throughout this section, we now wish to relate the vulnerability of a set of visible variables to a simple algebraic property of the visible variables' matrix.
We first summarize how the visible variables' matrix C ¼ B A ½ is constructed, knowing the relations among visible, sensitive and masking variables in a circuit T : each row i corresponds to a visible variable V i of T . each column j corresponds to either a mask or a sensitive variable of T . Assuming that the circuit T has m masks and s sensitive variables, C will have m þ s columns. The first m columns form matrix B and represent masks; the last s columns form matrix A and represent sensitive variables. the entry ði; jÞ is 1 iff the visible variable V i happens to depend on the mask or sensitive variable associated with column j. In light of Corollary 2, we can restate the xor-condition in the form we are now mainly concerned, referring to a property of the visible variables' matrix: a visible vector is vulnerable iff there exists such that C ¼ r r is of the form
where the stars may take any binary value. In words, this means that some F 2 -linear combination of the rows of C has all mask columns equal to 0 and at least one sensitive column equal to 1. Interestingly, as Theorem 4 states, we can determine whether a visible variables' matrix exposes some vulnerability by inspecting its reduced row echelon form. Recall first:
Definition 5. The reduced row echelon form C R of a binary matrix C is the unique binary matrix such that: 1) the row spaces 4 of C R and C coincide; 2) all nonzero rows of C R are above any rows of all zeros; 3) in each nonzero row of C R , the first 1 from the left (also called pivot) is strictly to the right of the pivot of the row above; 4) each pivot is the only 1 of its own column.
Theorem 4. A visible vector is vulnerable if and only if the reduced row
echelon form C R (computed in F 2 ) of the associated visible variables' matrix C has a sensitive pivot column.
Proof. Assume that C R has a sensitive pivot column, i.e., it has a row r r whose pivot column is sensitive. Such a row is thus of 3 . All the bits used to mask the implementation must take value 0 or 1 with the same probability and independently of each other. 4 . The row space of a matrix is the vector space of all linear combinations of its rows; in our setting, the underlying field is F 2 .
type (12) . On the other hand, r r is an F 2 -linear combination of rows of C, by property 1) of Definition 5. This shows that the associated visible vector is vulnerable.
Conversely, assume that C R has no sensitive pivot columns. Consider any row r r that is the F 2 -combination of n nonzero rows of C R with pivot columns j 1 ; . . . ; j n . By property 4), r r has 1's in all columns j 1 ; . . . ; j n . Since all pivot columns are mask columns by hypothesis, r r is not of type (12) . This proves that the row space of C R , which coincides with the row space of C again by property 1), does not contain any row of type (12) . It follows that the associated visible vector is not vulnerable. t u
We point out that Theorem 4 itself allows identifying a vulnerability, but not the minimum combination of visible variables that gives rise to such a vulnerability. Nevertheless, it enables to do so with an interesting computational efficiency. In fact, Albrecht et al. [20] proposed an algorithm (M4RI) that allows computing reduced echelon forms in F 2 with a complexity of Qðnm minðm; nÞ=logðmÞÞ for an n Â m matrix.
On the other hand, Theorem 4 also provides an alternative method, besides Corollary 2, for detecting the vulnerability order. Indeed, it is easy to convince oneself that the linear span of all rows of type (12) that appear in C R turns out to be the set of all rows r r of type (12) that can be written as C for some . Therefore:
where R is the linear span of all rows of type (12) that appear in C R .
Obviously, the less elements R has, the more efficient the latter method is. 
We can see that the column of S 1 is a pivot column: by Theorem 4, there is some vulnerability. The only row of type (12) in C R is r r ¼ 0 0 1 1 ½ , so R ¼ fr rg. The solutions to C ¼ r r are ð0; 0; 1; 1Þ and ð1; 1; 0; 1Þ, so V V is two-vulnerable by Corollary 3.
A PRACTICAL APPLICATION
To show a practical application of our method, we investigate the potential vulnerabilities of the SUBBYTES step of the first round of a hypothetical AES implementation similar to the one proposed in [1] . In that work, F 2 -linear transformations impact both sensitive variables and masks, while non-linear ones are applied only to sensitive variables using pre-computed lookup tables. We recall, on the grounds of Remark 3, that this is exactly one of the cases that can be addressed with our method.
Our implementation (see Fig. 1 ) aims at the protection against first and second order attacks through Boolean masking and consists of four masked SBOX blocks which process 4 bytes per cycle; the entire SUBBYTES takes thus four cycles to complete. As can be seen, eight independent random bytes (masks) protect the SUBBYTES stage and we take care of combining the masks into 16 unique pairs to protect each sensitive variable. 5 We also consider the following visible variables (in addition to the ones shown in Fig. 1 ), which are due to the initialization of the SBOX with the corresponding mask values:
Detecting the Vulnerabilities
To detect the minimum n-vulnerability, we solve the minimization problem in eq. (10) (see Corollary 2) . Practically, we find that V V is not one-vulnerable nor two-vulnerable. However, V V is three-vulnerable, because there are 16 vulnerable combinations of three visible variables, all of the form ðS x È M y È M z ; M y ; M z Þ. Vulnerable combinations of four visible variables can also be found, e.g., ðV 2 ; V 5 ; V 6 ; V 9 Þ. In the following section, we will explore this finding in more detail through a synthetic attack that exploits the information about such combinations.
Mounting the Attack
In this section, we mount a 3rd order attack towards
Þ-one of the configurations found previously-to find the corresponding key K 2 . Given Remark 1, we work with variables of 8 bits and attack the SBOX output byte as a whole, by using a commonly adopted procedure [3] . In fact, we assume that each cycle i has a measurable leakage L i that depends on the Hamming weight of the involved variables (plus normal noise): for i ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4,
Moreover, we consider the following initialization leakages:
HðV 18þ2i Þ þ N i2 : Fig. 1 . Cycle by cycle behavior of the considered architecture. In each of the four cycles, we compute four SBOX from four input variables. The output of each SBOX is a sensible variable which is masked with a pair of masks, taking care that each pair is not repeated twice.
5. For example, the mask pair ðM 1 ; M 2 Þ is only used to mask V 1 , despite the fact that M 1 and M 2 are reused for other sensitive variables. This is the result of a trade-off between implementation complexity and vulnerability. In fact, one could i) reuse the same four mask pairs in each cycle, exposing a second-order vulnerability, or ii) use 32 masks as recommended in [1] , guaranteeing secondorder protection at expense of circuit complexity and amount of random values.
A unique feature of our approach is that, given the potentially vulnerable combinations we can directly derive the leakages they originate from and combine them to extract the key (see eq. (11)). In our case, the vulnerable combinations originate from L 1 , L i1 and L i2 so we build the attack by considering the following product combining function:
We sample n leakages from L L ¼ ðL 1 ; L i1 ; L i2 Þ by running the synthetic model of the AES primitive with n random plaintexts. We then compute the correlation r k 2 between the attacker prediction function HðS 2 ðk 2 ; X 2 ÞÞ and CðL LÞ for every possible key guess k 2 , and we choose the k 2 that maximizes it. 6 For each attack, we consider the noise as a normal random variable with mean 0 and standard deviation s. Both n and s are thus discrete factors of our design of experiments, while each factors' combination corresponds to one experimental unit. In our analysis, factors n and s assume discrete values (aka levels) in the ranges ½20 Á 10 3 ; 100 Á 10 3 and ½0; 2 respectively. For each combination, we measure the corresponding success rate over 50 attacks. Finally, the experiment is repeated 30 times, keeping the plain texts fixed and varying the noise. Fig. 2 shows the average success rate for each factor combination and the associated 75 percent confidence interval. As expected, the ideal case s ¼ 0 corresponds to no variation of the success rate.
Experiments confirm that keys can be indeed extracted by using our methodology. The success rate clearly increases with the number of experiments; however, even in the ideal case of absence of noise, masking can be effectively defeated only above 60 K experiments (success rate ! 75 percent). Such a large amount of experiments, however, guarantees a modest ($ 25 percent) key extraction success rate when the noise standard deviation is around 2.
As a further example, if we wanted to protect the implementation at the 3rd order, we could have added an additional mask M 9 to all the visible variables. This would eliminate all the vulnerable triplets of the form ðS x È M y È M z ; M y ; M z Þ. Note that the countermeasure would still be susceptible to a 4th order attack, e.g., through the quadruple (V 2 ; V 5 ; V 6 ; V 9 ) and the combining function 7 CðL LÞ ¼ ðL 1 
Naturally, to complete such an attack, a suitable function of S 2 ; S 5 ; S 6 ; S 9 should be used as attacker prediction.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a method to detect early in the design cycle if a countermeasure holds up to the required protection order. To do this, we have promoted the search for vulnerabilities to a symbolic analysis by using a theoretically sound approach. To corroborate our findings, we have tested, on a synthetic AES model, to which extent the vulnerabilities found were effectively exploitable. We conjecture that any system that exposes a suitable leakage function (such as in Assumption 2) and data-flow (such as in eq. (9)) can still be addressed with the presented method. Concretely referring to software implementations, if one can measure the CPU power consumption associated with visible variables being stored in registers or memory then the same analysis could be applied.
Further developments of this work might involve both theoretical aspects-e.g., extending our method to non-linear transformations of masks-and practical aspects-e.g., integrating such an approach in a practical CAD design flow.
E½e t tÁc cðV V Þ j S S ¼ s s is finite for all t t, being the expectation of a bounded random variable. The expectations E½e t i N i are also finite for all t t, being moment generating functions of Gaussian random variables (see [21, Example 21.2 
]).
It follows that M L L j S S¼s s ðt tÞ is finite for all t t, so that by theorem 5 the distribution of L L given S S ¼ s s is determined by its moments. On the other hand, by eq. (2), we know that the moments of L L given S S ¼ s 1 s 1 equal the moments of L L given S S ¼ s 2 s 2 . The two distributions are therefore equal, thus proving that L L is not vulnerable.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof. 1) If the XOR-condition holds, there exists 2 F v 2 such that V V ¼ AS S cancels out any mask contribution and is non-constant. The random variables V V and AS S are therefore equal and non-constant, so they are not independent. We conclude that V V and S S are not independent either, i.e. V V is vulnerable.
2) Assume that S S and M M are independent, M M is uniformly distributed in F m 2 and the XOR-condition does not hold. We need to prove that V V is not vulnerable, i.e. 
since S S and M M are independent. We can see BM M ¼ v v È As 1 s 1 and BM M ¼ v v È As 2 s 2 as two F 2 -linear systems of v equations with m unknowns M 1 ; . . . ; M m , coefficient matrix B and constant vectors v v È As 1 s 1 and v v È As 2 s 2 respectively; we will call them s 1 s 1 -system and s 2 s 2 -system respectively. Since M M is uniformly distributed in F m 2 , it suffices to prove that the two systems have the same number of solutions c, so that the common value of (5) will be 2 Àm c. Assume first that the s 1 s 1 -system has no solutions; then by Rouch e-Capelli theorem the rank of B is strictly less than the rank of the augmented matrix 8 ðB j v v È As 1 s 1 Þ. Therefore, there exists a nonzero F 2 -linear combination of rows of ðB j v v È As 1 s 1 Þ that vanishes if restricted to B; in other terms, there exists a row vector 2 F v 2 such that B ¼ ð0; . . . ; 0Þ but ðv v È As 1 s 1 Þ ¼ 1. We then have
V V ¼ ðAS S È BM MÞ ¼ AS S:
Since we are supposing that the XOR-condition does not hold, we have that V V is constant, so As 1 s 1 ¼ As 2 s 2 . Therefore, ðv v È As 2 s 2 Þ ¼ ðv v È As 1 s 1 Þ ¼ 1. This fact, along with B ¼ 0 0, implies that the rank of B is strictly less than the rank of the augmented matrix ðB j v v È As 2 s 2 Þ; again by Rouch e-Capelli theorem, the s 2 s 2 -system has no solutions. To sum up, if one system is not solvable, then the other one is not solvable either, and (18) holds with both sides vanishing.
Assume now that both systems are solvable: let m mðs 1 s 1 Þ and m mðs 2 s 2 Þ be solutions of the s 1 s 1 -and the s 2 s 2 -system respectively. Then, by standard linear algebra, the solution sets of the two systems are m mðs 1 s 1 Þ È kerðBÞ and m mðs 2 s 2 Þ È kerðBÞ respectively. It follows that both systems have c solutions, where c is the cardinality of kerðBÞ. Note that, by the rank-nullity theorem, dimðkerðBÞÞ ¼ m À r, where r is the rank of B, hence kerðBÞ has 2 mÀr elements. In conclusion, if one system is solvable, then the other one is, and (18) 
